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Abstract: This paper intends to analyze whether airpower is decisive and irreplaceable in putting an 
end to violent conflict nowadays, evaluating airpower as an instrument in contemporary warfare and 
its role in peace operations. The research will seek to confirm or invalidate the hypothesis according 
to which airpower can successfully take the lead in the Western Allies’ contemporary stabilization 
operations given that it reduces costs in terms of human lives and resources. Moving forward, the 
research  will  focus  on  airpower  characteristics  in  the  Libyan  case,  with  an  analysis  of  NATO’s 
Operation Unified Protector. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Airpower is a vital element of the military, with a major evolution of its use in the last 
century.  Given  its  rapid  development,  triggered  by  technological  advancement,  and  its 
contemporary flexibility, in comparison with ground and naval powers, it has been argued 
that airpower will be the sufficient condition in waging and winning wars. This argument 
tends to be supported by the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, where the airpower was the 
main military capability used in the stabilization process. Symbolically less intrusive and 
perceived as less offensive than a ground intervention, and having the advantage of speed 
and fluidity, it is apparent that airpower is the key for contemporary peace operations.  
  Considering these factors, this paper intends to analyze whether airpower is decisive and 
irreplaceable  in  putting  an  end  to  violent  conflict  nowadays  and,  more  specifically  to 
investigate if airpower was the main asset in NATO’s mission in Libya. Finding an answer 
to these questions will be indicative of the tactical role played by air military capabilities in 
wars, while Libya’s case will be most revealing given the fact that the intervention was 
mostly based on airpower. Hence, the main focus will consist in the evaluation of airpower 
as an instrument in contemporary warfare and its role in peace operations. The research will 
seek to confirm or invalidate the hypothesis according to which airpower can successfully 
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take  the  lead  in  the  Western  Allies’  contemporary  stabilization  operations  given  that  it 
reduces costs in terms of human lives and resources. From this statement, another point finds 
its pertinence: airpower is an effective coercion instrument that can deliver results in a quick 
and precise manner with few casualties and collateral damage, capable of compelling any 
enemy  to  concede.  Last  but  not  least,  a  third  hypothesis  is  linked  to  the  importance  of 
airpower in conflict solution: the air power structures involved in military interventions have, 
more than the mandate of use of force, a dimension of peacemaking. 
  Having stated the goal of this research, the paper’s first section consists in providing a 
general perspective on airpower, and outlines its relevant functions for this present work. A 
second step would be that of identifying the influence that airpower has in compelling the 
enemy, as well as the role it plays in peace enforcement operations. Moving forward, the 
research  will  focus  on  airpower  characteristics  in  the  Libyan  case,  with  an  analysis  of 
NATO’s Operation Unified Protector. Also, linked to the study case, another dimension will 
be that of analyzing the impact of airpower not only in the peace enforcement process, but in 
the  complete  peace  support  operation,  including  peacemaking  efforts.  Finally,  a  critical 
perspective will discuss weaknesses highlighted by the use of airpower, especially in the 
Libyan intervention, such as disproportion in the allies’ contributions to the mission. 
  As for the methods used in developing the analysis, this research is mainly analytical (as 
opposed to descriptive), applied, qualitative and finally, conceptual, as it relates to existing 
theory  on  air  power.  This  paper`s  research  efforts  are  based  on  official  documents  and 
declarations of the UN, NATO, League of Arab States, and also on literature reviewing 
more extensively air power theory relevant for the present purposes and literature concerned 
specifically with Operation Unified Protector. 
The key concepts employed in order to verify the hypotheses and to review the impact 
of airpower capabilities in contemporary conflict solution revolve around the main aspects 
composing  the  paper’s  research  question.  Concepts  such  as:  air  power,  coercion,  air 
coercion, air interdiction, air superiority, peace enforcement, peacemaking, responsibility to 
protect  and  humanitarian  intervention  are  useful  in  the  effort  of  discovering  the  role  of 
airpower in conflict solution in Libya. 
PART 1: KEY CONCEPTS. A GENERAL PERSPECTIVE ON AIR POWER 
Firstly, it is necessary to establish the definitions that this paper operates with in order to 
reach its established goals. 
For the purpose of this paper, air power is defined in the terms of the most recent British 
Air and Space Power Doctrine as the “ability to project power from the air and space to 
influence the behavior of people or the course of event[1]; this definition was selected for its 
conceptual clarity, its reliable source and most importantly, for its comprehensive approach 
which reflects significant changes in the contemporary security environment and which aims 
“to  achieve  militarily  and  politically  favorable  outcomes  in  complex  crisis  by  using  all 
available  levers  of  power  in  a  cross-governmental  and  inter-agency  approach”.[2] 
Nonetheless,  one  should  not  be  deceived  in  believing  that  air  power  theory  is  entirely 
exposed in a clear and systematic way; on the contrary, many efforts to shed light into the 
matter begin by bluntly admitting that “airpower is not widely understood and […] the basic 
concepts  which  define  and  govern  airpower  remain  obscure  to  many  people,  even  to 
professional military officers”.[3] Recently, more than a decade later this problem does not 
seem to have been addressed; an  “unsound structure of theory and an unduly contested 
historical record”[4] persist. Although early flyers had already grasped the extraordinary 77  Airpower in contemporary interventions 
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opportunities of a new environment characterized by universality, speed and the ability to 
move  in  three  dimensions  which  ensured  a  greater  degree  of  invulnerability,  it  was  the 
contribution of famous practitioners, such as Generals Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, Billy 
Mitchell or Major Alexandre Seversky - which had laid the foundations of air power theory. 
Although airmen were more passionate air power advocates than impartial observers, their 
point of view should not be completely dismissed on grounds of subjectivity: similar to any 
other group, they perceive reality through their own institutional and bureaucratic filters, but 
taken together, they could provide a relatively accurate picture of the events. 
Early attempts to define and explain air power (often uncritically) relied on concepts of 
sea  power  –  mostly  of  Alfred  Mahan`s  and  Sir  Julian  Corbett`s  –  as  departing  points. 
Although connections can be observed between sea and air power – such as the 20
th century 
strive  to  achieve  superiority  or  command  in  a  new,  uncontrollable  environment  or  the 
support  provided  to land power  –  major  differences  among  the  two  concepts  cannot be 
overlooked. Firstly, sea power was regarded as a given for a very long time and although 
there  had  been  remarkable  leaders  in  sea  warfare,  until  Mahan  no  one  had  completely 
revealed its importance. Oppositely, air power advocates had to vividly and persistently push 
their enthusiastic ideas to get to be listened and taken seriously. Secondly, developments in 
the early days of naval were discussed virtually exclusively in professional circles, bearing 
little or no effects on the public opinion. To cite but one example, Mahan`s work, perhaps 
the world’s greatest naval historian and theoretician, remained influential within the national 
services and governments, but failed to become known and appreciated by the general public 
for a long time. In contrast, airpower benefited from the advantages of the newly-created 
mass-media (mass newspaper coverage, film, radio and television) which enabled air power 
advocates to reach and win a much wider public. 
Moreover, it can be argued the influence of sea power has been perceived directly and 
immediately only by the crews engaged in sea battles – and only in rarer situations by coastal 
populations  during  raids  or  gunboat  diplomacy  actions;  in  opposition,  the  effects  of  air 
power on the population were regarded as direct and imminent, beginning with the intended 
bombing of Venice in 1849, the aerial bombardments of London, Paris and German frontier 
cities in World War I, and continuing with the large-scale bombing raids of World War II up 
to the more recent 9/11 terrorist attack. Thirdly, technological advancements emerged at a 
much slower pace in the sea power field compared to the air power one; for instance, during 
the  123-year  period  of  naval  warfare  discussed  by  Mahan,  the  ships  largely  remained 
wooden and wind-driven while tactics did not change dramatically. In contrast, “starting 
from  very  humble  beginnings,  airpower  took  off  like  a  rocket”[5]  and  was  marked  by 
continuous and striking technological developments during a shorter period of time. Thus, it 
is only reasonably to understand why air power theory lagged far behind war realities for a 
long time. 
Despite some early enthusiasts’ naïve beliefs that airpower would render other military 
forces  impotent,  neither  armies  nor  navies  have  disappeared  or  drastically  declined  in 
importance; yet, it can be argued that both have become over time increasingly dependent on 
air power`s support. It is true that airpower possesses certain unique strengths – such as the 
capacity to directly assault physical centers of gravity regardless their location; to globally 
and  rapidly  project  force;  to  swiftly  and  globally  transport  people,  supplies  or  light 
equipment; or to insert and support small isolated expeditions, raids and garrisons. To a 
satisfactory degree, it can also protect friendly land and sea forces and other assets from 
enemy airpower; constitute the decisive strategic agent in high - and mid-level regular and 
conventional conflicts; compensate for deficiencies in friendly land and sea forces; and deny Ruxandra BOSILCA, Elena BUNOARA, Cristina ROSU, Denisa SAVA  78 
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enemy access to determined land and sea areas. However, air power has a poor record in 
“occupying” to control territory from the air alone (distinctively, armies are more likely to 
occupy enemy territory, pacify and hold it); sending clear diplomatic messages; applying 
decisive pressure for intended strategic effect in irregular conflicts; or, clearly discriminating 
between friend and foe. What is more, airpower is completely helpless when it comes to 
transport heavy and bulky loads on long distances at reasonable costs (which in contrast, sea 
power  can  successfully  accomplish);  seize  and  hold  disputed  territorial  objectives  or 
effectively manage an enemy`s surrender. Consequently, it is only reasonable to argue that 
both the presence of boots on the ground and the command of the sea have managed to 
preserve their important role in modern military operations. 
Regarding  the  functions  of  airpower  in  peace  operations,  in  general,  these  include: 
airlift, logistics, resupply, medical evacuation, aerial refueling, search and rescue, air traffic 
control  support,  combat  air  patrol,  airspace  control,  early  warning  of  hostile  actions, 
communications and others. Nevertheless, the intervention in Libya illustrates other essential 
air  power  functions,  such  as  ground  air  strikes,  air  interdiction,  and  ISR  (Intelligence-
Surveillance-Reconnaissance). Air interdiction is defined as “air operations conducted to 
divert, disrupt, delay, degrade or destroy an enemy’s military potential before it can be 
brought to bear effectively and at such distance that detailed integration of each air mission 
with the fire and the maneuver of friendly forces is not required”.[6]  ISR is described as “an 
activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and 
processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future 
operations”[7].  
Next, the use of air power for coercion and peace enforcement need to be discussed. In 
“Bombing to win: airpower and coercion in war”, Robert A. Pape claims that, in spite of its 
growing  importance  as  a  statecraft  instrument,  coercion  is  seen  as  “morally  repugnant” 
because it usually involves hurting civilians and is viewed as the “dark side” of international 
relations theory.  
Generally, when speaking about coercion, one thinks about the way in which states use 
force  to  compel  other  states  to  do  their  bidding.  Pape  argues  that  coercion  “involves 
persuading an opponent to stop an ongoing action or to start a new course of action by 
changing its calculations of costs and benefits”[8] and that coercion “seeks to force the 
opponents to alter their behavior”[9]. Pape continues by claiming that coercion is defined by 
the nature of the decision that the adversary is faced with and not by its intentions and 
behavior, “coercion occurs whenever a state must choose between making concession or 
suffering the consequences of continuing its present course of action. […] The universe of 
coercion includes nearly all attempts by states to force others to accept a change in the 
status quo”. 
Respectively,  military  coercion  is  the  use  of  military  instruments  to  change  an 
adversary’s behavior. Thus, air coercion can be defined as the use of air power to pressure 
an opponent to behave in a different manner than normally, in the presence of air attacks. 
Pape  sustains  that  air  power  is  “the  most  important  instrument  of  modern  military 
coercion”[10]  and  identifies  four  coercive  air  strategies:  punishment,  risk,  denial  and 
decapitation. 
The  first  strategy,  punishment,  targets  the  civilian  population,  infrastructure  and 
economy, and refers to inflicting pain on enemy civilians so that it forces the opponent to 
concede or the population to revolt against the government.[11] This strategy is no longer 
realistic. The second strategy, risk, also directed towards civilian population and economic 
targets  by  gradually  increasing  the  intensity  and  geographical  extent  of  attacks  thus 79  Airpower in contemporary interventions 
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compelling the opponent to concede to avoid further costs. The third strategy, denial, refers 
to  attacking  the  adversary’s  military  strategy  by  defeating  enemy  military  forces  and 
targeting arms manufacturing, stopping supplies, disrupting movement and communication 
on  the  theater  of  operations.  The  fourth  strategy  -  decapitation  refers  to  strikes  against 
leadership (political or military) and their ability to lead, either by targeting command and 
control or by attacking communication facilities. 
For Pape, air superiority is a phase in the pursuit of the above mentioned coercive air 
strategies, not a separate air strategy. Command of the air is needed to avoid encountering 
strong opposition and has to cover the attack targets and the air corridors to them, not the 
whole of the enemy territory.  
The next paragraphs will refer to the relation air power - peace enforcement and the role 
airpower plays in peace operations. Firstly, one finds it necessary to make the distinction 
between peace enforcement operations and peacekeeping operation. According to US Army 
Field Manual 100-5, “peace enforcement operations are military interventions in support of 
diplomatic efforts to restore peace or to establish the conditions for a peace force between 
hostile factions. […] Implies the use of force or its threat to coerce hostile factions to cease 
and desist from violent actions”. Peace enforcement units can “apply elements of combat 
power  to  restore  order,  to  separate  warring  factions,  and  to  return  the  environment  to 
conditions more conducive to civil order and discipline”.[12]  
While peacekeeping operations are mainly diplomatic and take place during an agreed 
ceasefire or monitor and facilitate implementation of a peace agreement, peace enforcement 
operations require an armed force as they often revolve around the use of military force to 
coerce compliance with resolutions or sanctions. Peace enforcement units are allowed to use 
lethal force in a hostile environment and do not require cooperation from members in the 
conflict.  
According to the UN, peace enforcement involves the application of coercive measures 
including the use of military force, with the authorization of the Security Council, in order to 
restore international peace and security. 
In “Beyond gunboat diplomacy: forceful application of airpower in peace enforcement 
operations”, Major James O. Tubbs defines peace enforcement as “a military intervention in 
an ongoing conflict that uses military force to coerce one or more belligerents to comply 
with mandated restrictions” with the goal to create the conditions for other peace efforts (e.g. 
humanitarian relief, diplomatic peacemaking) to help solve the conflict.  
James S. Corum, in “Airpower and peace enforcement”, argues that peace enforcement 
is not war, although “it still involves military combat operations and falls into the traditional 
American category of low-intensity conflict (LIC)”. He also claims “that peace enforcement 
may not have the consent of all parties, the intervening forces are not likely to be neutral, 
and are authorized to use force in situations other than self-defense”. 
Furthermore, Corum states that air power plays a major role in the success of peace 
enforcement  operations,  having  essential  contributions  such  as:  humanitarian  operations 
support  (providing  humanitarian  relief),  troops/equipment  airlift,  airfield  security,  force 
protection, psychological operations (psyops  have  a  decisive  role in  maintaining  general 
calm and cooperation from resident population), intelligence gathering (a difficult process 
considering that threats stem from small factions/militias strongly integrated in indigenous 
population),  providing  reconnaissance  and  surveillance.  Comparing  peace  enforcement 
operations with conventional wars, Corum also argues that peace enforcement operations are 
much more complex, that they do not seek to destroy, overthrow or subdue en enemy, but 
their mission “to impose peace” is rather vague and targeting opposing forces is difficult Ruxandra BOSILCA, Elena BUNOARA, Cristina ROSU, Denisa SAVA  80 
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when the adversary is unknown. The paper uses the definitions concerning peace support 
operations as they are present in NATO’s Glossary of Terms and Definitions. In this respect, 
it is important  to  make  the  clear  distinction  between  different  types  of conflict  solution 
approaches. According to NATO, Libya is considered as a peace support operation with a 
strong  component  of  peace  enforcement,  given  the  fact  that  such  mission  includes  an 
“operation conducted to maintain a ceasefire or peace agreement where the level of consent 
and compliance is uncertain and the threat of disruption is high. The peace support force 
must be capable of applying credible coercive force and must apply the provisions of the 
ceasefire or peace agreement impartially”.[13]  
Peace enforcement is just a part of the peace support operation which also implies a 
mandate from the United Nations Security Council to restore or maintain peace.[14]  Except 
these aspects, the paper intents to investigate whether NATO’s mission in Libya contained a 
dimension of peacemaking, understood as involving, more than the use of military power in 
conflict settlement, a diplomatic action supported by military action when necessary.  
Also valid in Libya’s case is defining the mission as a humanitarian operation, aimed at 
alleviating human suffering when the government fails to do so. However, this definition 
does not mention the type of measures which can be taken, be them civilian or military. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the military intervention in Libya, with its peace support 
operations, has taken place under the specter of the principle of the responsibility to protect, 
granting the capacity of the international community to intervene in a state’s affairs when it 
has evidence that the respective state has broken the obligation of protecting its own citizens. 
PART 2: NATO’S MISSION IN LIBYA: OPERATION UNIFIED 
PROTECTOR 
2.1. A General Overview of Operation Unified Protector 
After Libyan air defenses were crippled and the Qaddafi regime’s advances on the rebel city 
of  Benghazi  were  halted  by  a  U.S.-led  coalition  of  13  nations,  as  of  March  31  NATO 
assumed command and coalition military operations in Libya under the UNSCR 1970 and 
1973. The mission ended on 31 October 2011 becoming NATO’s most intense air campaign 
since Operation Allied Force during the Kosovo conflict in 1999. OUP was commanded by 
Canadian Air Force Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard (headquartered at the Allied Joint 
Force Command in Naples, Italy), who reported to Joint Force Commander U.S. General 
Sam Locklear, who, in turn reported to NATO Supreme Allied Commander U.S. Admiral 
James Stavridis.  
Although officials remained aware of the perils of engaging in the rapidly unfolding 
Arab Spring events, the case of Libya was characterized by several features which facilitated 
–  both  politically  and  militarily  -  NATO`s  intervention:  the  UN  mandate;  the  regional 
support  for  the  granted  by  regional  organizations  such  as  the  Arab  League;  a  broad 
recognition  of  NATO  intervention’s  added  value  addressing  an  impending  humanitarian 
crisis; and a short timeframe for action. 
OUP consisted of three elements: a UN-mandated arms embargo; a no-fly-zone over 
Libyan  territory;  and  actions  to  protect  civilians  from  attack  or  the  threat  of  attack  by 
military forces from the Qaddafi regime. As of March 8, NATO had conducted 24-hour air 
surveillance  of  Libyan  territory  and  the  Central  Mediterranean  for  which  they  used 
AWACS[15]  aircraft  deployed  for  NATO’s  counterterrorism  and  maritime  security 
operation in the Mediterranean Sea, Operation Active Endeavor. Starting March 23, NATO 81  Airpower in contemporary interventions 
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launched a maritime operation in order to enforce the arms embargo against the Libyan 
regime; during this operation, the participating vessels and aircraft monitored the Central 
Mediterranean off the Libyan coast and interdicted any vessels suspected of violating the 
arms embargo by carrying illegal arms or mercenaries. Three days later, on March 27 the no-
fly zone enforcement started under NATO`s command. On the same day, NATO Secretary 
General Rasmussen announced the expansion of the mission`s scope under the command of 
the Alliance in order to cover the implementation of all military aspects of UNSCR 1973- 
namely the protection of civilian and civilian areas through air strikes on Qaddafi’s ground 
forces. 
From a legal perspective, the 2011 NATO action in Libya illustrates the cosmopolitan 
action which refers to a range of uses for military forces by the international community 
aiming at the protection of individual rights by establishing stable and just societies. In this 
case, the international community waged an international armed conflict against Libya in 
order to prevent serious humanitarian abuses which had been undertaken in a separate, non-
international conflict between the Libyan governmental forces and armed opposition groups. 
However,  NATO`s  assumption  of  operations  over  Libya  much  coincided  with  Gaddafi 
regime forces’ shift from traditional to irregular warfare. In this case, air powers’ flexibility 
proved an extremely valuable asset for the Allies. 
It has been widely argued that OUP was a great success and that it shaped up a model of 
strategy for the Alliance in the 21
st century – for example, NATO Secretary General argued 
the lessons  learned  from  Libya  were  mainly  positive  and that they  only  highlighted  the 
Alliance`s flexibility, openness in its cooperation with its Middle East partners and strength; 
in  contrast,  other  views  have  strongly  claimed  that  the  Libyan  air  campaign  reflected 
NATO’s  limitations  rather  than  its  strengths  such  as  the  lack  of  a  coherent  strategy, 
participation issues, capability gaps  or  legality of the operation. 
In the Secretary General’s Annual Report 2011, Mr. Rasmussen described OUP as “one 
of the most remarkable in NATO’s history” and stated that NATO “proved itself as a force 
for good and the ultimate force multiplier”. He further said that is was also “an exemplary 
mission  of  cooperation  and  consultations  with  other  organizations,  including  UN,  the 
League of Arab States and the EU”.[16] It is important to underline that OUP involved a 
coalition of NATO allies and 5 non-NATO countries: Sweden and 4 other countries in the 
region.  The  participation  in  the  coalition  of  Jordan,  Morocco,  Qatar  and  United  Arab 
Emirates thus emphasized the strong regional support for NATO’s operation. When NATO 
took control and command over all military operations in Libya, it did so under the UN 
mandate  and  after  consultations  with  UN,  EU  and  the  League  of  Arab  States  and 
international  partners.  Furthermore  it  is  significant  to  highlight  that  only  after  extended 
regional support was clearly manifested, from the Arab League member states and from the 
Libyan National Transition Council that requested an intervention, did NATO act. 
As previously stated, NATO called upon regional organization (the European Union, the 
Arab League, African Union) to get involved and this military intervention benefited from 
strong  international  and  regional  support.  In  accordance  with  UNSCR  1970  (2011),  the 
European Union adopted a set of sanctions to interrupt the flow of money and weapons to 
the Gaddafi regime, provided 80.5 million euro in humanitarian assistance and participated 
in international discussion with partners to end the conflict. EU ground presence came in the 
form of EU delegations opening offices in Benghazi and Tripoli. The undergoing 30 million 
euro EU assistance program in Libya focuses on: reconciliation, elections and respect for 
human rights; public administrative capacity; media and civil society and promoting the 
involvement of women in public life; migration; health and education. Ruxandra BOSILCA, Elena BUNOARA, Cristina ROSU, Denisa SAVA  82 
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The only state neither a member of NATO or the Arab League to participated in the no-
fly  zone  was  Sweden.  The  Swedish  committed  several  aircrafts,  among  which  eight 
Swedish-built  fighter  jets,  a  transport  plane  and  a  reconnaissance  plane  to  Libya,  but 
underlined the fact that Swedish force will not be involved in ground strikes.[17]  Members 
of the Arab League were actively implicated in OUP; Jordan provided six fighter jets for 
logistic and escort support, while UAE sent several fighter jets to join the mission and Qatar 
contributed with six fighter jets, strategic support aircrafts to the no-fly zone operation and 
delivering of humanitarian assistance. By contrast, the African Union was slow to react and 
its response was not consistent. Before the Security Council vote it rejected any form of 
military  intervention,  but Gabon,  Nigeria and  South  Africa,  as  members  of  the  Security 
Council, voted approving the resolution. 
2.2. The Role of Airpower in NATO’s Peace Operation in Libya 
This section seeks to analyze the importance of airpower in putting an end to the violent 
Libyan civil war by investigating the characteristics of NATO’s mission in terms of conflict 
settlement. As previously stated NATO’s peace operation was based on a political mission, 
internationally legal and legitimate through the UN Security Council resolution 1973. Thus, 
one should keep in mind that the military was just a means in achieving the goal stated in the 
UN declaration, that of protecting civilians from the attacks of Gaddafi’s regime. The UN 
resolution was adopted in accordance with the responsibility to protect principle. In this 
context,  airpower  was  one  of  the  main  means  in  the  efforts  of  acting  according  to  the 
resolution. Given that the airpower represented the means for accomplishing the political 
purpose of protecting civilians, the analysis will focus on the role played by the joint allied 
air forces during the peace operations. So as to answer to the main question of this research, 
that  of  the  decisiveness  and  imperative  necessity  of  airpower  in  peace  settlement,  it  is 
important to see if the airpower was the key of success in Libya. 
  Speaking about the capacity of compellence of the military power, Schelling describes 
the ability, more than that of seizing and holding, to hurt and to exploit this diplomatically. 
Referring  specifically  to  airpower,  Warden  affirms  that  “provided  that  the  blow  be 
sufficiently swift and powerful, there is no reason why, within a few hours, or at the most 
days from the commencement of hostilities, the nerve system of the country should not be 
paralyzed”.[18]  These scholars underline the advantages that the military power in general 
and airpower in particular bring in conflict solving. However, the mission in Libya was 
longer than a few days, although NATO and its partners invested their resources with the 
purpose of ending the conflict and retreating from Libya as soon as possible. In order to find 
the answer to this inconsistency, one has to look first at how does the airpower help tactically 
in conflict settlement. The main question which has to be answered at this point is how to 
use force in order to coerce the enemy. Airpower has proved, since its use in wars, to have a 
big  impact  in  paralyzing  the  adversary,  however,  it  has  not  always  led  to  the  expected 
outcomes, as history shows us. A solution for that would be to target specific points that 
brought together compell the opposite army. A US Air Force Major in the Yugoslavian wars 
explains that “force can target the armed forces physical ability to fight; the government's 
ability to maintain order among the people and command and control of its armed forces, 
and the people's willingness to support the government and the armed forces”[19].  In the 
Libyan case, the last proposition does not stand, as the intervention occurred in a state of 
civil war where the majority of the population was not siding with the government. Thus, 
concrete measures applied by the air forces were physically destruction of Gaddafi’s armed 
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  It is to be noted that the definition of peace enforcement as given previously does not 
fully apply here; in the sense that OUP did not come in support of diplomatic efforts nor did 
it create a window for negotiations between the regime and rebels, and Qaddafi’s removal 
from power was seen as the only solution to the conflict. 
  If  one  applies  Pape’s  reasoning  regarding  airpower  strategies  to  this  military 
intervention,  the  observation  is  that  the  military  intervention  implemented  decapitation 
strategies against the command and control structures combined with denial strategies by 
reducing the regimes capability to respond and attack civilians. Air superiority, essential for 
these strategies was achieved rather swiftly by imposing the no-fly zone. 
  Airpower was used in the peace enforcement operation in Libya also by identifying 
units of troops loyal to the regime from the army (like Brigade 32, which was identified as 
the  main  unit  attacking  civilians)  and  not  mere  conscripts,  by  identifying  governmental 
command  and  control  nodes  and  attacking  them  (such  as  Misrata),  by  reducing  civilian 
casualties  so  as  to  gain  trust  of  the  population,  by  reducing  the  regime’s  capability  of 
attacking  civilians.  Thus,  the  Libyan  intervention  included  counter-air  operations, 
interdiction (by the installment of the no-fly zone), but also surveillance and reconnaissance. 
One can affirm that the airpower in Libya accomplished all roles attributed classically for air 
forces: aerospace control, force application (through strategic attacks and interdiction), force 
enhancement (through special operations, electronic combat and intelligence operations). 
In  Libya,  air  operations  ranged  from  defensive  counter  air  to  offensive  counter  air 
missions. Approximately 8,000 troops, over 260 air assets (fighter aircraft, surveillance and 
reconnaissance aircraft, air-to-air refuelers, unmanned aerial vehicles and attack helicopters) 
and 21 naval assets (supply ships, frigates, destroyers, submarines, amphibious assault ships 
and aircraft carriers) were employed. During the air mission, over 26,500 sorties destroyed 
more than 5,900 military targets including over 400 artillery or rocket launchers and over 
600 tanks or armored vehicles; the arms embargo covered a maritime surveillance area of 
approximately 61,000 nautical square miles and resulted in over 3,100 vessels being hailed, 
around 300 vessels being boarded and 11 ships having been denied transit to or from Libyan 
ports for being susceptible of posing a risk to the civilian population; while when it comes to 
humanitarian assistance, over 2,500 air, ground and maritime movements into Libya have 
been de-conflicted by NATO. Also, it is important to note that over 600 migrants in distress 
at sea were rescued directly by NATO maritime assets during this operation.  
Airpower was thus used for operations aimed at destroying nodes of communications, 
the enemy’s military assets, but also for boosting the population’s morale: because it did not 
have troops on ground, it was hard for the coalition to give an impulse to the population to 
fight  against  the  regime;  however,  NATO  attacked  locations  symbolic  for  the  regime’s 
power  (for  example,  the  state  security  headquarters  in  Tripoli)  or  dropped  leaflets.  Air 
interdiction was a great success during the Libyan campaign due to the achievement of air 
superiority (which allows a clearer identification and attack of enemy forces while exposing 
its  own  aircraft  to  reduced  risks);  quality  intelligence  gathering  on  enemy  movements, 
stockpiles  and  intentions;  persistence  (the  Allies`  prompt  intervention  did  not  leave  the 
enemy proper conditions to resupply); and the important relation between air and surface 
forces.  
An essential role in obtaining success was undoubtedly the ability to rapidly target and 
re-target, which became even more important after the shift from regular to irregular warfare. 
As a result, the 72-hours targeting cycle was shortened and the targeting planning cycle was 
drawn closer to execution in order so that the Prioritized Target List would keep up with the 
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As there were no boots on the ground (at least directly), highly advanced intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets proved crucial, especially in the case of urban 
area targets. And when it comes to ground air strikes, it is important to mention that this air 
campaign was based on the principle of achieving maximum effect with minimum force, 
meaning that the use of precision-guided munitions used against targets in populated areas 
enabled  the  Allies  to  achieve  their  targets  while  reducing  to  a  minimum  any  civilian 
casualties.  Whenever  during  targeting  the  level  of  collateral  damage  exceeded  the  CD 
authority levels delegated to the aircrew, the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) – 
which  benefited  from  additional  intelligence  such  as  live  feeds  from  unmanned  aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) - took over the decision to strike for further consideration. 
Although this operation was launched under the responsibility to protect and important 
targeting restrictions were imposed on NATO – which led many airpower enthusiasts to 
believe OUP represented the promise of a free-of-casualties future warfare - the high number 
of casualties on the side of rebel forces and civilians should not be dismissed. A Human 
Rights  Watch  report  indicated  that  NATO  has  failed  to  acknowledge  72  civilian  deaths 
(including 20 women and 24 children) resulting from eight NATO air strikes and has not 
investigated potentially unlawful attacks. 
All these above mentioned elements are indicative of the important role the airpower 
played  in  the  peace  enforcement  process.  However,  it  still  has  to  be  discussed  whether 
airpower was the key player that insured the success of the mission, and if it had a role in 
peacemaking.  
The success of the NATO mission in Libya has encouraged enthusiasts of the airpower 
to affirm that it will become the only military force needed to win wars in the near future. Its 
flexibility, precision and efficiency determined some voices to minimize the role of ground 
and naval powers in wars to come.  
However, one has to remind the fact that the success in Libya was assured not only by 
the  airpower,  but  by  the  naval  one  as  well.  Thus,  the  no-fly  zone  was  preceded  by  an 
embargo directed by NATO naval command center in Naples. Without the embargo, the 
arms, material and mercenaries’ traffic could not have been prevented, nor could persons in 
distress at sea while trying to reach the European shore would have been saved. Hence, it 
cannot be stated that the intervention owes its success fully to the air forces; moreover other 
capabilities played a vital role in insuring the achievement of the mission’s goal.  
Furthermore, although it cannot be considered as the equivalent of ground troops and 
given  that  it  was  a  state-by-state  endeavor  and  not  a  coalition’s  decision,  a  series  of 
European states and the United States sent some 100-200 foreign operatives on the ground, 
which had the mission to train and militarily coordinate the rebels. There were French arms 
drops, some Gulf States such as Qatar sent arms supply as well, while British operatives 
helped rebels targeting command and control nodes. Also, the US helped with intelligence 
collection.  These  actions  were  part  of  the  so  called  Operation  Dawn  Mermaid  to  seize 
Tripoli, which will eventually be successful and will prove to be the cornerstone for winning 
the war.[21]  Thus, this leads us to the conclusion that air power is most effectively while 
being integrated with land and sea forces. 
  Finally, while it is clear that airpower played a major role in the peace enforcement 
process, it is interesting to see whether the same can be argued for the peacemaking process. 
As stated at the beginning of this paper, peacemaking involves combining military power to 
diplomatic  actions  in  order  to  obtain  a  ceasefire.  Peacemaking,  in  comparison  to 
peacekeeping or peace-building, has to be a short-term process in order to be effective. In 
this  process,  the  military  capabilities  can  be  used  so  as  to  force  the  sides  to  initiate 85  Airpower in contemporary interventions 
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diplomatic talks. Thus, military power in peacemaking can be considered just a treatment of 
symptoms and not a cure for the disease. 
It is from this point of view that the airpower can be considered to be more effective for 
peace enforcement, being able to apply the necessary amount of coercive forces. In both 
peace enforcement and peacemaking the belligerents’ agreement over the implication of the 
third party is not necessary; hence these actions have come to be considered as synonyms of 
military intervention. In Libya’s particular case, the reason invoked by the Security Council 
for  mandating  an  intervention  was  that  of  protecting  the  civilians,  allowing  thus  the 
possibility to name the mission as a humanitarian operation as well. However,  NATO’s 
vision on this kind of operation does not mention if it involves civilian or military, or both, 
dimensions. 
  Referring  to  Libya,  the  mission  did  not  have  as  main  target  creating  space  for 
negotiations  between  the  regime  and  the  rebels;  moreover  after  the  beginning  of  the 
operations in March 2011, world leaders saw no other solution than the departure of Qaddafi 
from the country’s leadership. The only moment when the coalition sought a way for talks 
was in June 2011 when there was a stalemate in the advancement of the war. The mission 
lacked  another  key  aspect  of  a  peacemaking  operation,  that  of  impartiality  of  the 
intervenient, for it was clear that the NATO-led intervention aimed at removing Qaddafi and 
his regime from power. In this equation, airpower appears to have been used as the main 
coercer but with no clear intention of leading to the creation of a space for dialogue between 
the sides. Having analyzed the role of the aerial component in the 2011 intervention in 
Libya,  one  must  say  that  indeed  the  airpower  was  a  major  factor  in  achieving  the 
campaign’s  goals;  however  one cannot  draw  the  conclusion  that it  was  the  only  action 
needed for the conflict settlement. As it has been shown, while airpower was decisive in 
winning the war, by insuring force application, force enhancement and finally coercion of 
the enemy, it would not have succeeded in the absence of the naval power which helped 
insuring the arms embargo or without the operatives who trained rebels in seizing strategic 
points such as the capital. 
PART III: MAIN CRITIQUES TO THE INTERVENTION IN LIBYA 
The OUP of NATO in Libya has been the wake-up call for the Alliance and for security and 
defense spenders in countries all over the world. Either a success or a failure, it does not 
represent the ultimate test for NATO’s upcoming transformation or its lack thereof. The 
opinions of both participants and observers with regards to the relevance of the operation 
have diverged, yet most of them tackled the same levels of analysis: the political dimension, 
the military level, the legal aspects, the organizational terms and the humanitarian twist. 
Most importantly, in order to present in a new light the hypothesis initially presented in the 
paper the air power relevance and limits will be analyzed throughout the aforementioned 
points of scrutiny. 
From a political point of view, the relevance of the intervention is quite sizeable. Even 
though it reflected longstanding disagreements and foreseeable stalemates in the command 
and control structures, it pointed out new drawbacks that the alliance is bound to encounter 
in the near future either in/out of specific operations. First of all, the difficulty in achieving 
consensus for a military intervention in Libya is relevant; moreover the divided opinions of 
the NATO allies to assume the leadership of the intervention in Libya from USAFRICOM is 
even more telling. The US had led the initial intervention in Libya under Resolution 1970 
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EU  proved  unprepared,  weak  and  unwilling  to  acquire  such  a  task,  once  again  proving 
NATO’s first choice statute in the field of international security and defense.  
These difficulties resided in each of the Allies’ national interest and in the wider, more 
general context of the financial crisis and reduced defense budget spending. For the Unites 
States, the Afghanistan syndrome, the relatively disputable success of the Operation Iraqi 
Freedom  and  the  unwillingness  of  the  American  taxpayer  to  support  further  out-of-area 
operations  have  contributed  to  a  decreased  interest  in  the  pursuit  of  ensuring  either  the 
participation in the OUP or the decision to initiate it in the first place. The idea of the US 
getting entangled in another Middle East conflict was not promising at all. Still, the decision 
to be a crucial part of the OUP was reached due to the rising calls for action of the Arab 
League. On the other hand, the European counterparts exhibited their internal turmoil and 
their traditional reluctance to engage in such operations while some refreshed their position 
within the Alliance in promising ways. For the bulk of the European allies, the participation 
in the political decision making behind the operation was nil. For Germany, Turkey and 
Greece for instance the opposition to such an endeavor marked a recurrent gap in European 
so sought for consensus, each bringing a series of reasons onto the table. Germany showed 
its well-known rejection of military involvement whatsoever and showed its discontent with 
the idea of military intervention. The internal political context is relevant to the case. Turkey 
and Greece observed a shift from total rejection to the actual participation in the operation, 
as little as they could.[22] Still, the great surprise of the Operation was the wonderful reset of 
relations between the UK and France. They collaborated in what came to be later known as 
the Entente Frugale and the coordination of the two, with France assuming the leadership of 
the operation and UK backing it completely marked the revival of French presence within 
NATO that had been dormant for almost more than half a century. Most of all, the operation 
reflected a “low turnout and a growth in caveat countries”.[23] 
From the air power triad of interest it is important to take into consideration the fact that 
even though the OUP engaged in all of the three Resolution-based actions: “a UN-mandated 
arms embargo; a no-fly-zone over Libyan territory; and actions to protect civilians from 
attack or the threat of attack by military forces from the Qaddafi regime”. [24], the consensus 
was easier reached in the case of the no-fly zone. It seems less intrusive and more justifiable 
in the light of the humanitarian character of the intervention. Still, the decision to start and 
support air strikes on the airfield were more the prerogative of the British, French and US 
force with partial Polish, Portuguese and Danish and Dutch backing. The peace enforcement 
dimension of the operation was more important and effective in the attempt to stop the 
Libyan  regime  from  openly  attacking  its  population  than  the  later  coming  part  of 
peacekeeping activities. All of the actors, especially the directly involved  ones supported 
surgical attacks and an intervention to last at least as possible. The peace keeping dimension 
was short-lived and proceeded by a massive intrusion and regime change intervention: the 
operation was finalized with the dismissal of the Gaddafi regime and the support of the 
Transitional Council.  
From a humanitarian dimension, the number of victims was increasingly reduced due to 
the technological advancement of air power, as mentioned earlier in the paper. The problems 
posed by the operation appeared when the shift in the fighting strategy of the state army. 
Intermingling with the civilians posed a serious problem in terms of ISR for the operation 
and increasingly affected the comprehensive approach intended to alleviate such expected 
outcomes. Moreover, the lack of organization of the armed rebel forces posed an increasing 
risk  to  the  humanitarian  success  of  the  intervention  since  sometimes  air  strikes  would 
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From a legal point of view, some detractors consider that the prerogatives mentioned in 
the 1972 UNSC Resolution were bent. The existing collateral damage registered (that due to 
air power advances were supposed to be minimal if not inexistent) and the close to- boots on 
the ground approach of the allied air forces of US, UK and France mainly point to that. The 
second component is relevant taking into consideration that there were testifiable accounts of 
arms being air dropped to rebels, helicopter use and the dispatching of Special Forces to 
military advise the Transitional Council. The crisis management operation model that Libya 
was supposed to entail, effectively fulfilled its features, however it sometimes exceeded its 
limits. The regime removal and the peacemaking quick actions pointed to a new way of 
extending  the  humanitarian  assistance  and  evacuation  vs.  the  air  superiority  dimension 
promoted by the NATO European counterparts. Nonetheless, the general opinion agrees that 
the new system for “deconfliction” worked as a charm in its sea, land and air power facets. 
From a military dimension, the Operation Unified Protector mirrored a political impasse 
that had severe repercussions on all levels of action. The capabilities gap encountered within 
the Alliance was exposed during all the phases of the operation with countries that “conduct 
offensive air operations, those that relegate their actions to air policing, effectively a non-
combat role and those which fail to appear at all”.[25]  At the initial contact point, the 
transfer  of  logistics  and  intelligence-gathering  personnel  as  well  the  assembly  and 
deployment of specific air fighters proved a cumbersome task. The command and control 
structure suffered a lot from the lack of cooperation of some European Allies (most notably 
Italy and Germany) and caused serious delays in performing the initial air strikes against 
vital nodes of communication, infrastructure and IADS (Integrated Air Defense System). 
The targeting expertise was almost absent during OUP and as a general pattern that can be 
observed repeatedly, the US supplied the necessary missing personnel. This difficulty in turn 
entailed severe communication strains between the INTEL centers of the Allies and US 
intervention once again saved the day.[26]  
There was a divergence in the later phases of the operation, with the US pursuing a 
secondary degree of interest and involvement in the operations requiring air superiority. The 
US focused on the humanitarian dimension and its actions were consistent with that until the 
end. The political factors earlier analyzed had a groundbreaking impact on this perspective. 
On another level, the US support was incremental tactically and strategically speaking. 
Even  if  it  wanted  to  keep  a  lower  profile,  the  US  involvement  and  contribution  to  the 
operation was crucial. After several months of bomb air strikes et.al, the ammunition stocks 
of the European Allies were depleted and they had to be restacked with US assistance and 
internal production. Their importance lay in the PGMs most of the jets used that minimized 
collateral damage. This situation pointed to the inability and lack of preparedness of Europe 
to  support  a  long-term  operation  with  basic  supplies.  Similarly,  the  US  support  was 
paramount in the air-to-air refueling operations, a facility the European Allies completely 
lacked.  
The  two-tiered  Alliance  was  obvious  also  in  the  subsequent  undermining  of  the 
interoperability of the mission and the pooling and sharing conceptual misinterpretation.[27] 
There were several deadlocks during the operation especially with regards to the types of 
weapons to be employed and to the coordination of the personnel in manned air vehicles. 
Also, the idea of pooling and sharing prompted a problem since some of the poolers were not 
sharers. Germany was reluctant to share its “ISR, theatre ballistic missile defense or deep 
strike by indigenous air-launched cruise missiles”[28], whereas Poland was under significant 
political turmoil and could not provide the necessary fighters for the operation. The same 
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Denmark, Canada and Norway) the contribution was significant, even if there are not strong 
Allies or major contributors. The advantage posed by the operation and that boosted their 
support was that of short timeframe. In case the operation would have lasted longer than a 
few months, the costs would have not been bearable for the small states even with their 
stable GDPs. 
The operation was not only air based but also sea- and land- based. The amphibious 
weapons of the US and the UK assisted in air-strikes with effective results in the initial 
phases of the operation and not only. The siege of Misrata is well-known to have been 
successfully lifted with the help of British and French vessels. However, there are analysts 
that consider that the OUP could have been undertaken without sea-based support given the 
geographical proximity of Libya to Europe. This is not the case for future, more distanced 
out-of-area operations. The air power supremacy in this context was not ensured and this is 
also reflected in the ground operations that were taking place (although at a lower level) in 
the theatres of operations in Libya. The difficulty of the synchronization of the operations is 
also  another  factor  that  proves  that  experience  in  amphibious  operations  and  complex 
maneuvers is essential for a quick victory. 
Nonetheless, examples of air power operational and technological prolixity could have 
been observed. The adaptability of the operation was presented via the use of British Apache 
and  Tigre  and  Gazelle  French  Helicopters  for  major  interdiction  strikes  engaging  both 
ground and maritime targets near Misrata with very few collateral victims. The parts of air 
interdiction and close air support were ensured by the French and the British mainly[29]. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As  shown,  air  power  theory  continues  to  lag  far  behind  practice;  the  lack  of  a 
comprehensive, coherent and most of all objective theoretical body is certainly a reality 
which  hampers  further  research  in  the field.  As  previously  indicated,  the  NATO-led  air 
operations had certainly a paramount role within all parts of the OUP; this mission proved 
that  air  assets  form  a  critical  component  of  modern  military  operations  which  can 
significantly contribute to its success. Nevertheless, the role of sea power and also, to a 
certain extent and more indirectly, of land power to the mission should not be overlooked in 
a temptation to overestimate air power qualities while ignoring it is obvious limitations. To 
conclude, air power is indeed effective but it delivers its best results while being integrated 
with land and sea forces. 
All in all, the OUP showed the strong points of the use of air power (more legitimacy, 
increased precision, less collateral damage and decreased number of victims), yet it also 
enabled a clear view of its shortcomings. The success of the peace enforcement operation 
was not followed by the same zeal regarding the peacemaking section of the operation, with 
important allies opting for a short humanitarian intervention, with no troops intervening in 
the conflict. The stringent problems within NATO were presented with an emphasis on the 
air power dimensions and some facts could be stated. The operation was too expensive for its 
dimensions; the European Allies could have not supported it in the case of a protracted 
conflict of normal dimensions. The US is still either willingly or not the main NATO Ally 
and its reshaping of strategic interests could gravely affect the capability of the Alliance to 
pursue such operations on other occasions with the same degree of success. Nevertheless, the 
development of some national industries, the specialization of the member countries and the 
cogent implementation of the smart defense concept could gradually ensure a more balanced 
burden-sharing within NATO. 89  Airpower in contemporary interventions 
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For a first time test, the success is ensured. From the air powers theorists’ points of 
view, the air power advantages overcame initial political turmoil, ensured the stabilization of 
the area and the close support of the civilian population. The complete legality of the actions 
and the one-power character of the operation are disputable. 
  Having extensively analyzed the use of airpower in military operations, with a study 
case based on the 2011 Libyan intervention, one is able of assessing the degree of validity of 
the hypotheses highlighted at the beginning of this research paper. Thus, this study intended 
to see the role of the airpower in contemporary stabilization missions. The findings show that 
indeed the function of coercion of airpower proves its value for the Libya operation. Derived 
from that, airpower can be considered to be a decisive factor in waging and winning in 
contemporary warfare; it has shown to be an effective coercion instrument that offers the 
necessary coercive measures to restore peace and security. However, one should keep in 
mind that while it was necessary, airpower was not the only military component used by the 
forces intervening in Libya, as it was successfully combined with naval assets. As for the 
peace support dimension, airpower was part of the effort of enforcing peace given that, being 
a military means, it was instrumental in achieving the stated political goal: that of securing 
civilians and putting an end to a violent civil war. 
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